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Abstract 
This paper explores the way information security awareness connects to the overall information 
security management framework it serves. To date, the formulation of security awareness initiatives 
has tended to ignore the important relationship with the overall security management context, and vice 
versa. In this paper we show that the two processes can be aligned so as to ensure that awareness 
activities serve the security management strategy and that security management exploits the benefits 
of an effective awareness effort. To do so, we analyze the processes of security awareness and security 
management using a process analysis framework and we explore their interactions. The identification of 
these interactions results in making us able to place awareness in a security management framework 
instead of viewing it as an isolated security mechanism.  
Keywords: Security Management, Security Awareness, Process Analysis 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Information systems security management comprises understanding information security 
requirements, establishing security policy and objectives for information security, implementing and 
operating controls to manage information security risks, monitoring and reviewing the performance 
and effectiveness of them and continuous improving (ISO/IEC 27001, 2005). Security awareness is a 
critical element of security management (CSI, 2008), that refers to the process of making users aware of 
security risks, focus their attention on security and allow them to recognize security concerns and 
respond accordingly (NIST, 2003). Security awareness has been studied by security researchers and 
practitioners mainly as a risk mitigation mechanism, separately from other information security 
management processes. As a result, it is not clear how the process of information security awareness 
interacts with other security management practices. In this paper we aim at exploring the research 
question "in what ways is awareness connected to the other processes of security management and 
what are their interactions?”. Investigating this question is important, since revealing the interactions of 
the two processes influences security practitioners with regard to time and resource allocation, the 
time-plan and the overall security project-management. In addition, it will be of use to security 
researchers, as it will enhance exploring the problematical issues of security awareness in the security 
framework where they happen. For this purpose, we first define organizational processes and then we 
use this framework to define the two processes and their interaction. Our analysis does not aim at 
identifying a process modeling technique, but a framework of conceiving organizational processes in 
order to make sense of the awareness and security management interaction.  
The paper is organized in five sections. In the next section we describe current approaches for defining 
organizational processes. Section 3 is dedicated in identifying the ways researchers regard the 
interaction between awareness and security management. In Sections 4 and 5 we analyze security 
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management and awareness, accordingly, using the GED framework to gain insight into the process 
goals, activities or problems. The following section presents a discussion concerning the interactions 
between awareness and security management that have been identified. Finally, the conclusions and 
further research issues are presented.   
2 DESCRIBING ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESSES 
An organizational process can be defined as "a set of logically-related tasks performed to achieve a 
defined organizational outcome" (Davenport and Short, 1990). Crowston (2000) differentiates two basic 
perspectives in defining organizational processes: 
I. Goal-oriented, which includes the identification of the final process result, the parameters that 
have to be fulfilled for the goal's achievement, the transformation of input to output for its 
accomplishment, the recipient of the process result as well as the person that poses the process 
goal or the person who benefits from it, and 
II. Sequence-oriented, which defines a sequential and hierarchical recording of all involved events. 
This includes identifying a set of observations about the events that happened in past 
performances of the process and a set of predictions about what will happen in future 
performances.  
A complementary perspective to the sequence-oriented approach views organizational processes as a 
construct of events, whose realization is bounded by a set of restrains and interdependences. As, 
Crowston (2000) refers Malone and Crowston (1994) proposed two major classes of dependencies: a) flow 
or producer/consumer dependencies and b) shared resource dependencies. The first class arises when 
the product of an activity is a prerequisite for the execution of another activity. The second class of 
dependencies arises when two or more activities require the same resources. Davenport and Short (1990) 
classify organizational processes into three major dimensions according to: 1) the organizational entities 
or subunits involved (interorganizational, interfunctional or interindividual processes), 2) the type of 
objects manipulated (physical or informational), and 3) the type of activities taking place (operational or 
managerial). 
In this paper, we follow the approach proposed by Katzenstein and Lerch (2000) for modeling 
organizational processes, which incorporates all the above mentioned elements of organizational 
processes: goals, sequence and dependencies and is referred to as the GED (Goal – Exception – 
Dependency) framework. Besides these, GED also takes into account elements of possible deviations 
from the expected process development. In this approach, an organizational process comprises the 
following elements: 
a. Goals of either the overall process or of individuals participating in the process. 
b. Roles, which present a linked set of actions, obligations, perspectives, and other concerns which 
characterize an individual or group of individuals. 
c. Exceptions, which are reasons of deviations from standard development of the process, such as 
random occurrences, errors, conflicting organizational or political goals.  
d. Dependencies, that include dependencies from logistic, financial, informational, or managerial 
elements which occur within the establishment of relationships among the process members to 
achieve their goals. 
This approach provides an analytical tool for making sense of organizational processes in a high level of 
abstraction. Moreover, the GED framework has been validated according to a set of process 
representation criteria (Katzenstein and Lerch, 2000) so as to a) capture what goes on in the process 
(content criterion), b) capture what may emerge or change in the process (status criterion), and c) 
provide practical and user friendly representations (presentation and use criterion). During our analysis 
we have identified a number of exceptional deviations or dependency situations, which could not be 
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categorized under the predefined exceptions or dependencies. An example refers to conflicting 
perceptions that may result in unpredicted process developments. For this reason we have enriched the 
GED framework to include additional dependencies and exceptions’ categories: perceptions, 
availabilities and trust have helped us capture more social aspects of the processes that constitute 
dependencies and exceptions. 
3 CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN AWARENESS AND SECURITY 
MANAGEMENT  
Information security awareness can be considered as an internal element of information security 
management, but up to now, it has not been thoroughly studied in relation to its organizational and 
security management context. In the following, we identify the ways researchers perceive the 
association of awareness and security management within the body of security literature, using the 
basic criteria of process representation (goal-orientation, sequence-orientation, restrains and 
dependencies) described earlier.   
Many researchers discuss the interaction between the two processes in terms of sequence. Hansche 
(2001) and Everett (2006) place awareness after the security management tasks of risk analysis, security 
policy formulation and countermeasures specification have been fulfilled. Okenyi & Owens (2007) claim 
that establishing a security policy is a prerequisite towards building a security awareness program. 
Peltier (2005) argues that organizational goals are the core of security management and, thus, all security 
management activities should be centered on business goals. Under this perspective, the author views 
security awareness connected to security management in a goal-oriented way: awareness is connected 
through the established business goals into a coherent security management framework and the role of 
awareness is to support the business goals and to make the security program acceptable by the 
members of the organization. For example, within the process of awareness the reasons for adopting a 
security policy should be justified in terms of the business goals it would serve. Interactions between 
awareness and security management can be clearly identified in Spurling’s (1995) empirical research. The 
author proposes a security program development that sequentially connects awareness with other 
security management activities. Awareness is placed in the phase of risk treatment, after security 
measures and policies have been specified. Spurling also connects awareness to security management, 
in terms of goals, as it is reported that security awareness should be aligned with the security vision and 
philosophy.  
Power and Forte (2006) establish a more concrete connection between awareness and security 
management in their case study: awareness and security management goals both serve the overall 
security mission. In addition, the organization establishes a global security team which is responsible for 
security management and awareness at the same time. Vroom and von Solms (2002) claim that 
formulating a security policy constitutes a prerequisite for designing the process of security awareness, 
since the former defines the tasks for the personnel, the procedures for reporting security incidents and 
for educating staff. Thus, the processes of security policy formulation and awareness are dependent 
(information and managerial dependency). Financial and managerial dependencies are widely accepted 
by most researchers (Everett, 2006; Okenyi and Owens, 2007; Peltier, 2005; Power and Forte, 2006) as 
management commitment to awareness and cost approval are considered essential. 
According to the approach adopted by ISO/IEC 27001 (2005), security management unfolds in four stages, 
namely: a) Plan, b) Do, c) Check, and d) Act whilst the process of awareness is placed, in a sequence-
oriented manner, within the second stage of security management (in the ‘Do’ phase) (p. 6, 30), as 
depicted in Figure 1. ISO/IEC 27002:2005 is closely interrelated to ISO/IEC 27001:2005, and provides 
implementation guidance for designing controls. It proposes control objectives and controls, structured 
in a categorization of eleven clauses that aim at meeting the requirements identified by a risk 
assessment process. The ISO/IEC 27002:2005 best practices mainly refer to the ‘Plan’ and ‘Do’ phases. 
ISO/IEC 27002:2005 places awareness in several clauses, namely: security policy (awareness requirements 
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should be defined in the security policy document), organization of information security (as a part of 
management’s commitment to security and as a way of achieving internal security co-ordination among 
managers, users, administrators, application designers, etc.), human resources management (during 
employment a level of awareness relevant to the employees’ roles and responsibilities within the 
organization should be aimed regarding the security procedures and policies, and the correct use of 
information processing facilities before access is granted), information security incident management 
(awareness should include information on known threats, who to contact for further security advice 
and the proper channels for reporting information security incidents, business continuity management 
(awareness should create understanding of the business continuity processes),  communications and 
operations management (awareness should be a control for the protection of malicious code), and 
compliance (awareness should promote the intellectual property rights protection and data protection 
principles). 
Conclusively, as indicated by relevant literature, the processes of security management and awareness 
are not independent from each other but are interconnected; however their boundaries remain unclear 
to security researchers and practitioners. 
 
Figure 1: Awareness and security management interaction (ISO/IEC 27001, 2005; ENISA, 2008) 
4 ANALYZING THE PROCESS OF INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT  
In order to further understand the interplay between the processes of security management and 
awareness, we analyze the two processes using the GED framework, by identifying a) their goals, b) the 
roles that participate, c) the dependencies, and d) the exceptions that exist.  
To begin with, according to the classification scheme proposed by Davenport and Short (1990) security 
management is a horizontal process that crosses different divisional units or departments of 
organizations; thus it is an interfunctional process (Davenport and Short, 1990). Both physical and 
informational objects are manipulated within security management, where physical objects include the 
physical infrastructure of security measures while informational objects include security plans, policies 
etc. Typical activities of security management are mainly managerial, since they support and control the 
operational tasks; such as, for example, the authentication and auditing tasks that aim at constraining 
and controlling personnel while performing their operational duties. 
In the following, we base our analysis of the process of security management provided in the widely 
accepted security standards ISO/IEC 27001 (2005) and NIST (2002). Since it is not our aim to model the 
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process of security management, but to make sense of its main components, this identification is not 
meant to be exhaustive but exploratory.   
According to ISO/IEC 27001 (2005), the fundamental security management goals are preserving integrity, 
availability and confidentiality of information. NIST (2002) adds accountability, and also authenticity, 
non-repudiation and reliability as complementary security management goals (ISO/IEC 27001, 2005). 
Security management involved roles include decision makers, operation staff, users and developers 
(ISO/IEC 27005, 2008).  
4.1 GED analysis of security management ‘Plan’ phase 
The planning phase of security management (ISO/IEC 27001, 2005), or as is also known the phase of 
establishing the Information Security Management System (ISMS), includes defining the ISMS policy, as 
well as the objectives, processes and procedures which are relevant to managing the risks and 
improving information security in order to deliver results in accordance with an organization’s overall 
policies and objectives.  
The goals of this phase are to define the scope and boundaries of the ISMS, to identify a risk assessment 
methodology that is suited to the ISMS, to establish a security team that will plan and operate the ISMS, 
to develop criteria for accepting risks and identify the acceptable levels of risk, to perform risk 
assessment, to evaluate potential mitigating strategies, to select countermeasures for the treatment of 
risks, to define an ISMS policy, and to obtain management approval of the proposed residual risks and 
management authorization to implement and operate the ISMS. It should be noticed that within the 
formulation of the risk treatment plan, ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) proposes the introduction of awareness 
activities to achieve several control objectives (clauses of security policy, organization of information 
security, human resources security, communications and operations management, information security 
incident management, business continuity management, and compliance).   
In addition to the exception and dependency types proposed by GED, we have also identified the 
influence of intangible dependencies (such as trust and perceptions), unavailability and deliberate 
actions exceptions. Overall, the following dependencies have been identified: 
 Informational: These include architectural and functional requirements, interfaces, data, threat and 
vulnerability evaluations which are required for performing risk assessment. 
 Management approvals: for risk management, investments, involving personnel. 
 Trust: during communication of confidential information to the security team, especially when 
security management is outsourced. 
 Resources: security management funding. 
 Perceptions: Language and understanding between the involved parties.  
Finally, the following exceptions may arise: 
 Random events, such as advancements in technology and security, unclear system functionality and 
security incidents that raise attention to specific threats. 
 Errors: Overrated or underestimated threats or impacts, missing software or hardware components. 
 Conflicts: Different security perceptions, different security goals, opposing risk analysis evaluations, 
opposing risk mitigating strategies. 
 Availability: Difficulties in meeting management, in arranging evaluation meetings. 
4.2 GED analysis of the security management ‘Do’ phase 
The second stage of security management (the ‘Do’ phase), entails the implementation of the ISMS 
policy, and the application of security controls, processes and procedures. Its goals are to formulate a 
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risk mitigation plan, to implement the selected controls, to define a measurement plan for the 
effectiveness of the selected controls, to implement training and awareness programs, to manage the 
operation and resources of the ISMS, and to implement incident and reporting procedures. We should 
notice that the implementation of the risk mitigation plan includes the implementation of the 
awareness activities that aim at the security policy, organization of information security, human 
resources security, communications and operations management, information security incident 
management, business continuity management, and compliance control objectives (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005). 
The dependencies we have identified are the following: 
 Informational: they include the available security tools and techniques, organizational policies and 
software development methodologies. 
 Resources: security measures implementation cost, training and education of security officers and 
other members. 
The following exceptions may appear: 
 Errors: user, operator or administrator errors that can lead to security violations, non-reporting of 
security incidents or vulnerabilities. 
 Conflicts: following security guidelines may slow down system functionality and usability, users often 
ignore security practices. 
 Perceptions: stakeholders do not understand their personal role in security. 
4.3 GED analysis of the security management ‘Check’ phase 
‘Check’ refers to assessing and measuring the process performance against the ISMS policy, measuring 
the objectives and practical experience and reporting the results to management for review. The goals 
of this phase are to execute monitoring and reviewing actions for detecting errors, identifying and 
handling of security breaches and preventing security incidents, to undertake regular reviews of the 
effectiveness of the ISMS, to measure the effectiveness of controls, and to review risk assessments at 
planned intervals. 
The identified dependencies are: 
 Informational: reports from event and audit tools, security metrics. 
 Trust related: stakeholders should feel trust to report a security violation or vulnerability. 
Furthermore, the following exceptions may appear: 
 Random events: for instance, no identification of vulnerabilities during sample inspections. 
 Errors: such as the underestimation of a security incidence by users. 
 Deliberate actions: deliberate modification of event or audit trails, hiding of evidence. 
 Conflicts: deviations on the strategies to handle a security incident. 
 Availability: of the security officer to respond to users’ security doubts. 
4.4 GED analysis of the security management ‘Act’ phase 
The final phase of security management is the Act phase, where corrective and preventive actions take 
place guided by the internal ISMS audit and management reviews, in order to achieve continual 
improvement of the ISMS. Its goals are to implement the identified improvements, to take appropriate 
corrective and preventive actions, to communicate the actions and improvements to all interested 
parties and agree on how to proceed, and to ensure that planned improvements achieve their intended 
objectives. 
For the Act phase the identified dependencies are: 
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 Informational: the previous stage (checking) reports and results. 
 Availability: of the security team to realize adjustments. 
 Management approvals: to conduct new security study or to implement changes. 
 Resources: funding of changes. 
Finally, the following exceptions may occur: 
 Errors: changes can lead to system dysfunction. 
 Conflicts: with regard to the selection of adjusting actions. 
5 ANALYZING THE PROCESS OF SECURITY AWARENESS  
With regard to the classification proposed by Davenport and Short (1990), awareness is an interfunctional 
process that crosses different divisional units or departments of organizations; e.g. the Human 
Resources department for identifying and dividing audience groups and the Technical Department for 
exploring major users’ errors and problems. The object types are mainly informational, such as the 
awareness work plan, security messages, or feedback questionnaires. Physical objects may also be 
included, for example posters, leaflets or other artifacts that convey security messages. Finally, typical 
awareness activities are managerial; they support and inspire the operational tasks; for example, they 
promote work practices that enhance the security vision. In the following we analyze the process of 
security awareness using the GED framework, by identifying the a) goals, b) roles, c) dependencies, and 
d) exceptions commonly found in awareness activities.   
Major objectives of security awareness include a) changing users’ behavior (NIST, 2003), b) changing 
users’ work habits (Hansche (2001), and c) making users understand their personal role and 
responsibilities towards security (Peltier, 2005). The involved roles are not clearly specified; top 
management, managers, security officers may be involved in different cases. The activities of awareness 
unfold in three phases: a) Plan, Assess & Design, b) Execute & Manage, and c) Evaluate & Adjust (ENISA, 
2008). NIST (2003) similarly describes the awareness and training lifecycle as comprising four steps: 1) 
program design, 2) material development, 3) program implementation, and 4) post-implementation. 
5.1 GED analysis of the 'Plan, Assess & Design' phase 
The 'Plan, Assess & Design' phase involves (ENISA, 2008) identifying needs, developing an awareness plan 
and establishing priorities. The goals of the first awareness phase are to establish the awareness team, 
to ensure a change management approach, to define awareness goals and objectives, to identify 
audience groups, to select awareness material, to develop a detailed work plan, to select 
communication channels and strategies, and to define indicators to measure the success of the 
program. This phase includes the activities of program design and material development of the NIST 
(2003) framework. Although the activities described are similar to ENISA (2008), the NIST (2003) standard 
pays additional focus on the selection of a centralized or distributed (to the organizational units) 
implementation. Taking into account the steps required to fulfill these goals, the following 
dependencies exist: 
 Informational: information that is required for understanding the environment and setting the 
priorities, such as system architecture, functionality, users, organization policies, security policy, risk 
analysis results, system inventory and application user ID databases to determine all who have 
access. 
 Management approvals: they are necessary for the conduction of the awareness program and the 
formation of the awareness team  
 Resources: program funding, available communication channels, potential material. 
At the same time, the following exceptions may intervene to the planning phase: 
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 Random events: confusing or conflicting system functionalities that makes audience groups 
segregation difficult. 
 Errors: for instance, overloading awareness content with unnecessary information. 
 Conflicts: different security perceptions or goals, different opinions about scheduling awareness 
actions or selecting centralized or decentralized implementation. 
 Availability: difficulties in managing meetings or in arranging team meetings. 
5.2 GED analysis of the 'Execute & Manage' phase 
The ‘Execute & Manage’ step refers to all activities necessary to implement an information security 
awareness program (ENISA, 2008). This phase corresponds to the implementation step of the NIST (2003) 
framework. According to both standards, for this process to be executed and managed a needs 
assessment should have been conducted, a strategy developed, an awareness program plan for 
implementing that strategy should have been completed and material should have been developed. Its 
goals are to confirm the awareness team, to review the work plan, to implement designed actions, to 
deliver communications, and to document experience. Dependencies of the 'Execute & Manage' sub-
process are: 
 Informational: the documentation and results produced in the first phase, including audience group 
lists, communication channels, appropriate content, time-plan etc. 
 Resources: funding awareness material (e.g. posters, leaflets). 
 Availability: employees working hours for attending the program. 
For this phase the exceptions that may happen include: 
 Random events: emergent working events may prohibit employees’ attendance. 
 Errors: neglecting to write down important events during program conduction. 
 Conflicts: managers that do not disengage their associates. 
 Perceptions: language/terminology of security experts, difficulties in the understanding of the 
program by the users. 
5.3 GED analysis of the 'Evaluate & Adjust' phase 
The 'Evaluate & Adjust' phase (ENISA, 2008) includes procedures of formal evaluation and feedback 
mechanisms to evaluate the achievement of objectives initially established for the program and 
corresponds to the post - implementation step of the NIST (2003). Its goals include evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the program, to review the feedback captured, to adjust the program and to re-launch 
the program (when it is necessary). The continuous monitoring could also be performed by an 
automated tracking system (NIST, 2003) that could capture key information regarding awareness and 
training program activities. For this phase the identified dependencies are: 
 Informational: The goals that have been documented in the first phase, awareness metrics or 
indicators documented in the first phase as well etc. 
 Resources: funding adjustments or new program execution. 
 Management approvals: for adjusting the program or for new execution. 
Finally, the exceptions that may happen are: 
 Errors: Neglecting to take into account important events during evaluation. 
 Conflicts: Opposing opinions regarding corrective actions. 
873 
6 DISCUSSION 
As mentioned in section 3, awareness is typically perceived as a part of the implementation activities of 
security management. In this section we argue that there is an extended interplay between the two 
processes and that awareness activities interact with security management activities during all its 
stages.  
The main implication of the traditional view, that is placing awareness within the ‘Do’ phase of security 
management cycle, is that awareness activities focus mainly on facilitating the application of the 
countermeasures, as revealed earlier in this paper. However, it has been suggested that security 
awareness objectives should not be narrowed in this way, but should also include goals such as the 
motivation of information system stakeholders. Drevin et al. (2007) identify the following fundamental 
awareness objectives: maximizing integrity, confidentiality and availability of data and hardware and 
maximizing acceptance of responsibility of actions. Therefore, the goal-oriented connection of 
awareness to the process of security management is wider than just enhancing the application of 
safeguards. In addition, we argue that security awareness can facilitate tackling security management 
dependencies and prevent its exceptions. 
In the ‘Plan’ phase of security management a security team is defined, the organizational context is 
studied and the boundaries of the information system are specified. Awareness actions that could take 
place at the same time are the appointment of a security awareness officer or team and the study of 
organizational context and members to identify audience groups and communications channels. For 
example, during the security management ‘Plan’ phase users’ security needs are examined for risk 
analysis purposes; an action that is also required for awareness ‘Plan, Assess & Design’ phase. In 
addition, ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) suggests the specification of security education, training and awareness 
requirements as a part of the security policy principles’ formulation; such an activity is closely 
interconnected with the activities of awareness ‘Plan, Assess & Design’. Moreover, security 
management planning could be hindered by conflicts regarding security goals. Awareness actions could 
confront this exception, since awareness aims at creating a common understanding of security by 
defining the main security concepts. This action, as Furnell et al. (2007) claim, would facilitate the 
creation of common security perceptions. In addition, during the 'Plan, Assess & Design' stage of the 
process of security awareness the available communication channels are examined and evaluated. The 
result of this activity could assist in confronting security management availability exceptions. Moreover, 
the creation of a common security perception among members of the security team would prevent 
conflicts and errors during risk analysis, since the threat, vulnerability and impact evaluations would be 
more informed and accurate. Finally, informing the security team with the results of recent research, 
surveys, statistical evidence and advancements in security technology would facilitate overcoming 
informational dependencies in security management planning.  
Within the implementation phase of security management the interaction between the two processes 
is well established. Awareness activities facilitate the adoption of security policy and security practices 
by preventing the exceptions of perceptions, conflicts and also errors. This is achieved through raising 
the attention towards the importance of security, the personal role on security of the organizational 
members and also the importance of reporting security violations and incidents. Moreover, awareness 
activities are connected to the pursuit of several security control objectives as pointed out in ISO/IEC 
27002 (2005), e.g. to ensure information security events and weaknesses are communicated in a way 
allowing timely corrective action to be taken (information security incident management clause). 
During the 'Check' phase of security management, errors can happen if users don’t report in time 
security incidents or vulnerabilities. Awareness is quite important in eliciting the sense of incident 
reporting to the users. Moreover, awareness actions could facilitate surmounting informational 
dependencies faced by administrators (e.g. provision of audit & event logging analysis criteria). 
Furthermore, making top management aware of the importance of keeping security management 
current could facilitate overcoming approval dependencies of the ‘Adjusting’ phase.  
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Overall, there are several informational dependencies posed to awareness activities that result from the 
process of security management. The security requirements identified during risk analysis feed the 
awareness content design or direct the focus on specific threats and vulnerabilities. Countermeasures 
and policies also provide input for the process of awareness; for example role-based access control 
would specify information regarding users’ roles, rights and obligations or the communication channels 
to security officer in case of an incident. Therefore, the interconnections of security management and 
awareness are not narrowed to a single phase of security management, but instead awareness activities 
interact with security management activities throughout the entire process. Thus, the interplay 
between security management and awareness can be depicted as shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Extended interaction of security management and awareness 
7 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This paper explores the way security awareness connects to the overall information security 
management framework. Up to now, awareness has not been studied in relation to other security 
management activities. Our analysis links awareness activities with security management tasks in terms 
of goals, events, people involved and interdependencies.  
We have analyzed the processes of security management and awareness process separately and we 
have identified interactions between their goals, roles, dependencies or emergent events. Through the 
analysis we have come to the conclusion that security awareness should not be viewed as a collection 
of tasks narrowed to a single phase of security management (Figure 1), but as a process that should 
evolve in parallel to other security management activities (Figure 2). If designed and executed in this 
way (an indicative alignment of the two processes is presented in Table 1), the awareness process could 
facilitate security planning, the implementation of controls, security checking and adjusting by serving 
several goals simultaneously: compose a security awareness team that cooperates with the security 
team, facilitate the dialogue between the security experts and stakeholders involved, impede conflicts 
that come from ignorance or disinterest, provide information where informational dependencies exist 
and promote security policy adoption. Moreover, such an alignment would ensure that awareness 
actions also facilitate tackling security management dependencies and prevent its exceptions. 
Another conclusion that stems from the analysis presented is that in both cases, it is hard to relate 
process goals with the individuals that pursue them or that are served by their fulfillment. Such a 
correlation would be beneficial for each process analysis individually but also for the examination of 
security management and awareness interactions. A further step would be to exploit the findings of the 
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analysis presented in this paper in order to formulate security management and awareness strategies in 
a way that acknowledges their interactions and practically implement these strategies in a real 
organizational setting. Furthermore, since awareness is only the first step of a security learning 
continuum (NIST, 2003) that proceeds with training and education, it would be of interest to adapt the 
process-oriented framework used in this paper studying training and education activities’ interplay with 
security management tasks. Furthermore, similar analysis could be made based on other security 
standards describing the overall security management process, such as NIST (2006). 
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Table 20: The security management and awareness indicative alignment
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